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The "Fair and Equitable" Doctrine: Are Liquidation
Rights a Realistic Standard During
Corporate Reorganization?
John H. Frye, m*
In past years, much has been written concerning the concept that ex-
changes of corporate securities must, in certain circumstances, be "fair and
equitable." Controversy has existed concerning the effect which must be
given this requirement, particularly in view of the fact that such effect may
vary depending upon the purpose of the corporate reorganization requiring
the exchange of securities. Specifically, commentators have advanced
views concerning the effect given the term "fair and equitable" under two
federal statutes: the Bankruptcy Act' and the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act.2
As Professor Walter Blum pointed out in 1958,3 to conduct such an
analysis at a time when the development of doctrine seems to have become
a matter of historical interest may be considered a luxury.
The general state of the economy following the depression has been
healthy, and consequently there has been little need to examine the "fair
and equitable" standard since that time. The case law developed by the
Supreme Court consists, with perhaps one or two exceptions, of reorganiza-
tions which came out of the 1930's and the enactment of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act.
However, this happy state of economic affairs appears to have suffered
at least a temporary reversal. Every week the financial news reports that
* Of the firm of Frye & Keeffe, Washington, D.C. A.B., Davidson College, 1958;
LL.B. Vanderbilt University, 1965; member of the Tennessee and District of Columbia
bars. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Daniel J. Gifford
and Arthur J. Keeffe for their advice and criticism in the preparation of this paper.
1. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
2. Act of August 26, 1935, ch. 687, § 33, 49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6
(1964).
3. Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate Reorganizations, A Re-
appraisal, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1958).
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companies are seeking the benefits of bankruptcy reorganization. The
largest of these has been the Penn-Central Railroad. Consequently, the
"fair and equitable" standard is likely to play a most important role in the
future as the financial affairs of distressed companies are put in order.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the "fair and equitable" doctrine
as developed by the Supreme Court in order to appreciate the issues pre-
sented by today's reorganizations, and to propose a course to be followed in
those reorganizations.
By way of background, the Bankruptcy Act provides a means by which
corporations which are insolvent in either the bankruptcy or equity sense
may renovate their financial structures, receive a discharge from their debts,
and continue business, 4 while the Public Utility Holding Company Act was
enacted to combat the evils which existed in the complex systems of public
utilities which had grown up in the years prior to the Act's passage.6
These utility systems, after the Act's passage, were required to "simplify"
themselves. Typically, this entailed merger, consolidation and/or liqui-
dation of the corporations in the system.
Both acts require that the securities of the old corporation be called in and
that cash and/or new securities of an equal worth be issued to replace them.
Both acts require that the exchange set out by the plan of reorganization or
simplification must be "fair and equitable." The source of the "fair and
equitable" requirement may be found in the old equity receivership re-
organization cases. Much of the meaning ascribed to these words had its
origin in those cases.
7
The legacy of the receivership reorganization cases is manifested chiefly in
the rule of absolute priority. This rule must be adhered to in reorganizations
4. See generally I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 0.01-0.08 and 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 77.01-77.02 (14th ed. 1969).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1964).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(e), 621(2) (1964); 15 U.S.C. § 79k(e) (1964).
7. See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Alb. & Chic. Ry., 174 U.S. 674
(1899). This case set down the rule that a secured creditor could not offer the share-
holders of a corporation an interest in the proceeds of a foreclosure sale in order to se-
cure a speedy sale without objections to the detriment of the unsecured creditors. In
that case the sale was conducted under an agreement between the bondholders and
shareholders in order to allow the corporation to escape liability to its unsecured credi-
tors. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). In this case, Boyd was
an unsecured creditor of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the predecessor of the
Northern Pacific Railway Company. The assets of the railroad had been subjected to
foreclosure and sold. The shareholders of the distressed Northern Pacific Rail had
purchased the assets of the railroad at the foreclosure sale through the medium of
the new Northern Pacific Railway. After applying the proceeds to the secured claims
and expenses of sale, nothing was left for the unsecured creditors. The Supreme Court
struck down the sale. The shareholders could not be allowed to participate in the reor-
ganized corporation to the detriment of the unsecured creditors. "The invalidity of the
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under both acts.8 Simply stated, the rule of absolute priority requires that
each security holder, in the order of his priority, receive full compensation
for the rights he surrenders.9
In order to determine the effect given the words "fair and equitable" and
the rule of absolute priority in reorganizations, one must consider three vari-
ables: first, the worth of the corporation; second, the worth of the claims
(both debt and equity); and third, the number and character of the securi-
ties issued by the reorganized corporation which will be deemed adequate
compensation for the individual claims against the old corporation. This
article will deal with the second and third variables and mention the first
only briefly.
Part I - The "Fair and Equitable" Test as Applied to Allocations
of Securities Under the Reorganization Provisions
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act
The Worth of the Corporation
Mr. Justice Holmes once stated that "the commercial value of property
consists in the expectation of income from it."1°  This statement has fur-
nished the premise to be followed in determining the worth of the corpora-
tion. Because the corporation will continue its business after reorganiza-
tion, its worth must be determined on a going concern basis.1 '
In Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pacific Railroad Co.1 2 the value of the railroad was determined by relying
mainly on the earnings experience of the railroad. Since the resulting dol-
lar figure was less than the total debt of the railroad, the court concluded
that the common stock had no value. The common shareholders were
accordingly denied participation in the reorganization plan. In order to gain
participation in the plan the common shareholders had to show that the value
of the railroad was sufficient to cover the debt of the railroad and provide
an excess which could be applied to the equity interests. A heavier weight-
sale flowed from the character of the reorganization agreement regardless of the value
of the property, for in cases like this, the question must be decided according to a fixed
principle, not leaving the rights of creditors to depend upon the balancing of evidence
as to whether, on the day of the sale the property was insufficient to pay prior encum-
brances." Id. at 507.
8. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1945); Group of Institutional Investors v.
Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
9. 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
10. Galveston, H. & San A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226 (1908).
11. Consolidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
12. See cases cited note 8 supra,
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ing of "cost of reproduction new and less depreciation"' 3 of the road's assets
would have accomplished this purpose. The common shareholders argued,
in fact, that a heavier weighting of those factors was constitutionally re-
quired. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and reasserted the
proposition of Mr. Justice Holmes that the value of property inheres in the
expectation of income from it.
Because the securities to be issued by the reorganized corporation ought to
reflect the worth of the property which underlies them, the worth or dollar
value which is assigned to them will theoretically represent the worth of the
corporation determined on a going concern basis. 14  Some writers have
pointed out, however, that the valuation of the corporation often is not
realistic, with the result that the securities issued by the reorganized corpora-
tion fail to live up to the values assigned to them. 15
The Worth of the Claims Against the Corporation
In order to take advantage of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act a corporation must be insolvent in either the bankruptcy or equity sense,
a situation in which it might be subjected to actual liquidation.'" When in-
solvency occurs, creditors with claims currently due are, at best, paid some
time after their debts have matured, and doubt is cast upon the corporation's
ability to pay its debts in the future. At the point of insolvency, only the
method of valuing claims against the corporation according to their rights
upon liquidation of the corporation would produce greater value for the
senior claims than for those of shareholders. Any other method of valuation
would lessen the value of the senior claims and benefit the holders of equity
because they are entitled to receive whatever is left after the senior claims
are compensated. Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded that in bank-
13. The relevant language of 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1964) provides "[tihe value [of
the assets] shall be determined on a basis which will give due consideration to the earn-
ing power of the property .... In determining such value only such effect shall be
given to the present cost of reproduction new and less depreciation and original cost
of the property, and the actual investment therein, as may be required under the law
of the land, in light of its earning power and all other relevant facts." But see FPC v.
Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
14. It has been held that valueless securities should not be issued to cover the possi-
bility that earnings will increase sufficiently above anticipated earnings to give the se-
curities value. Consolidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
15. Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations:
New Directions, 67 HARv. L. REV. 553 (1954); Billyou, "New Directions": A Fur-
ther Comment, 67 I-IkRv. L. REV. 1379 (1954); Blum, The 'Wew Directions" for Pri-
ority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1367 (1954); Brudney,
The Investment-Value Doctrine and Corporate Readjustments, 72 HARv. L. REV. 645
(1959).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 205, 530 (1964).
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ruptcy reorganizations any method of valuing claims other than according to
their rights upon liquidation would tend to compensate the holders of
equity in the corporation for the "nuisance value" of their claims incident to
control of the corporation. 17
But if claims against the corporation must be valued as if the corporation
were being liquidated, then compensation for the holders of equity would
appear justified whenever they held "valuable rights" which they surren-
dered in reorganization. Such a "valuable right" might be the power to
prevent the creditors of the corporation from enforcing their legal remedies
for a period of time. If the holders of equity released such a power so that
the corporation might be reorganized, they would benefit the corporation
creditors to the extent that these creditors would receive new claims against
the reorganized and (hopefully) profitable corporation in exchange for their
old claims against the unprofitable corporation. The holders of equity would
at the same time lose their right to attempt to put the old corporation on a
paying basis without the dilution of their claims against it as a result of
reorganization or liquidation. Thus the holders of equity would appear to
have parted with a right which ought to be compensated in accord with the
probability that it would have brought them benefit.' s
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.19 Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the court, dealt with a right similar to the one discussed im-
mediately above. The shareholders of the Lumber Company had, at a time
prior to the reorganization, exacted an agreement from the bondholders which
would allow the shareholders to continue in control without interference for
a number of years. Subsequently, when the agreement had seven years to
run, the shareholders consented to the revocation of the agreement in return
for the bondholders' consent to a plan of reorganization which the share-
holders had formulated. This reorganization plan was to be effected
through proceedings in a state court or under chapter ten of the Bankruptcy
Act, and the shareholders had the power to designate which proceeding
would be employed. They chose chapter ten. The plan allowed the share-
17. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S.
523 (1943); Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); Consolidated Rock
Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106
(1939); cf. SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949). The origin of the
rule seems to lie in the fact that the equity receivership cases effected reorganization
through a foreclosure sale. See note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
18. The equity interest ought to be entitled to the benefits the right might have pro-
duced for them in terms of earnings sufficient to pay prior charges and leave some ex-
cess for the common stock. They ought not to receive compensation for the fact that
they could have delayed the reorganization.
19. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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holders to participate in the allocations of the securities to be issued by the
reorganized corporation. The shareholders justified their participation by
pointing to the right to control which they had relinquished in exchange for
the bondholders' consent to the reorganization plan. Mr. Justice Douglas
assumed that the shareholders had given up a valuable right on relinquish-
ing their right to control for the prescribed period and that the bondholders
had been under a disability to interfere with that control prior to the re-
linquishment. At the same time he refused to allow the shareholders to par-
ticipate in the plan. Although he might have been able to base the decision
on the ground that the shareholders' right to control was without value, 20
Mr. Justice Douglas relied instead on the idea that, on invoking the jurisdic-
tion of the Bankruptcy Court, the shareholders "necessarily waived or
abandoned"'21 their right to control of the corporation. Mr. Justice Doug-
las seemed to think that the allowance of compensation on the basis of the
surrendered right to control would allow the parties to a reorganization to
dictate to the court the terms of the reorganization. This had been the prac-
tice prior to the enactment of the reorganization provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and had furnished one of the chief reasons for enacting those
provisions.
22
Mr. Justice Douglas was unquestionably correct in holding that the parties
could not dictate to the court the terms of the reorganization plan. But once
the agreement by which the parties had attempted to bind the court had been
struck down, the question remained whether the shareholders had a right,
acquired in the first agreement with the bondholders, for which compensa-
tion was due. To the extent that the Lumber Products case, supra, stands
for the proposition that such compensation should not be awarded, it appears
to benefit the creditors of the corporation at the expense of the share-
holders.23
While the value affixed to the claims against the corporation is to be de-
termined as if the corporation were in liquidation, the method of determin-
ing the worth of the corporation discussed above brought out the fact that the
securities to be issued by the reorganized corporation should represent the
worth of the corporation determined on a going concern basis. 24  Thus the
20. The financial situation of the corporation was such that the claims of the bond-
holders were about four times the highest worth that might be placed on the assets. Id.
at 119.
21. Id. at 127.
22. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 0.04 (14th ed. 1969).
23. Cf. Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968); Blum, Some Margi-
nal Notes on TMT Trailer Ferry Reorganization: The New Math?, 1968 Sup. CT.
REV. 77. In TMT the Supreme Court may have tacitly recognized that the ability to
delay a reorganization existing in junior security holders is not without value.
24. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
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new securities, in most cases, will be worth less than the claims against the
corporation. Because the absolute priority rule requires that each senior
claim must receive full compensation before any distribution is made to the
next junior claim,2 5 the difference between the worth of the new securities
and the value affixed to the claims will represent the extent to which junior
claims will be denied compensation.
26
The Allocation of New Securities Among the Participating Claims:
Claims of Successive Priority on the Same Assets
The financial posture of the corporation in reorganization resembles that
which could precipitate actual liquidation, and actual liquidation would re-
sult in the payment of claims in cash. As a result, the rule of absolute
priority in bankruptcy reorganization requires that the worth of the new
securities equal the liquidation value of the participating claims to which
they are allocated.27  The equivalence required by the rule of absolute
priority is quantitative equivalence.
The term quantitative is used to refer solely to worth in the sense of the
number of securities or the aggregate of the dollar figures affixed to them.
28
It is used chiefly to distinguish this characteristic of a security from the inci-
dents of the security contract, which include for example the priority of the
security's claim on earnings and, in the event of liquidation, assets. The
incidents of the security contract are characterized as being qualitative. Two
securities with identical contracts are qualitative equivalents, while two se-
curities with successive claims on earnings and assets are respectively
qualitatively superior and qualitatively inferior.
Because the value of the securities issued by the reorganized corporation
is, theoretically, the going concern value of the corporation, 29 and because
the claims are valued as if the corporation were in liquidation, 0 quantita-
tive equivalence of the new securities to the participating claims means that
the going concern value of the corporation is supposedly the same as the
value of the liquidation rights of the participating claims. The going concern
25. See notes 8 and 9 supra, and accompanying text.
26. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & Rio G. W. R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 516
(1946).
27. Consolidated Rock v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 529-30 (1941). See also Recon-
struction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & Rio G. W. R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 517-18 (1946).
28. Should those who formulate the plan of reorganization not place a dollar amount
on the securities to be issued-a matter within their discretion--equivalence must still
be effected in some quantitative measure. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago,
Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 564-65 (1943).
29. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
30. See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
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value of the corporation is determined by capitalizing estimated earnings at a
rate appropriate to the economic setting in which the corporation is operat-
ing.81 This results in an estimation of the amount of capital needed to
produce the estimated earnings. The claimant receives, therefore, securi-
ties evidencing a contribution of that portion of the capital of the corpora-
tion which is the quantitative equivalent of the liquidation value of his claim.
However, because reorganization usually results in a reduction of fixed
charges, the claimant will in all probability receive new securities which are
qualitatively inferior to his claim.
The portion of capital represented by the securities received by the claim-
ant ought to be interchangeable with the same portion of capital in a hypo-
thetical corporation which is entirely identical to the claimant's corporation.
But the portion of capital that the claimant receives in satisfaction of his
claim will, in most cases, be qualitatively inferior to the claim. Therefore,
in his exchange with the hypothetical corporation the claimant would be
left, as he was on the exchange of new securities for old, with qualitatively
inferior securities.
Thus, while the claimant may have received the quantitative equivalent
of his claim in the reorganization, he will not have received securities which
can be exchanged on the same basis as his claim could have been ex-
changed. The qualitative inferiority of the securities has resulted in a lessen-
ing of the worth of the claim. This occurs because capital attributable to the
claim has remained the same while the protection afforded that capital has
been reduced.
It will be noted that the qualitative incidents of the security contract pro-
tect the quantitative investment in the business enterprise. Qualitative inci-
dents provide the investor with protection with respect to the earnings of the
going concern and with respect to assets should the concern be liquidated.
Qualitative rights, then, protect an investment in cash. It follows therefore
that cash is qualitatively superior compensation when compared with securi-
ties.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the court in Institutional Investors
3 2
held that if claims junior to those which have given up qualitative rights are
allowed to participate in the reorganized corporation, compensation must be
paid for the loss of those qualitative rights. The requirement that the claims
be valued according to liquidation rights dictates that this compensation be
given.38 Had liquidation taken place, the claimant would have been paid the
31. See notes 10, 11 and 12 supra, and accompanying text.
32. 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
33. There are two arguments against such compensation. First, the fact that the
1971]
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full amount of his contractual claim in cash. Because cash is qualitatively
superior compensation, it may be assumed that qualitative rights beneficial
both in a going concern and on liquidation are compensated by payment in
cash. If these qualitative rights are fully compensated on liquidation by
a cash payment representing quantitative equality, and liquidation rights
are the measure of the claim in reorganization, it follows that qualitative
rights must be separately compensated in a transaction in which quantitative
equivalence is effected in securities rather than cash.
Institutional Investors was remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC), charged with the responsibility of approving plans of reorganiza-
tion of railroads by Section 7734 of the Bankruptcy Act, so that the ICC
might approve modifications in the plan which would award compensa-
tion to the senior claimants for the loss of qualitative rights. The ICC took
the following steps. First, cash payments were made to the senior securi-
ties. These payments were equivalent to the interest earned by the old
claims to the current date and constituted a greater amount than was due
on the securities given in exchange for the claims. Second, a fund was
created which would inure to the benefit of the old bondholders by being ap-
plied to the retirement of the securities given in exchange for the bonds. Pay-
ments into the fund were to equal 50 percent of the dividends paid to the new
common stock .
5
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Reorganization36 the ICC was
again faced with the task of providing the senior participating claims with
compensation for the loss of qualitative rights. The Rio Grande Western
qualitative rights to be compensated included those of benefit in a going concern, as well
as rights beneficial on liquidation, presents some difficulty. The theory that the claims
against the corporation are to be valued as if the corporation were in liquidation might
be said to preclude compensation for qualitative rights beneficial only in a going con-
cern. Thus it may be argued compensation for qualitative rights ought to be limited to
only those rights which come into operation on liquidation. Second, the argument that
those rights which come into operation on liquidation are "used up" in the reorganization
and are therefore not entitled to compensation may be deserving of some weight. This
argument stands on the premise that reorganization is a substitute for liquidation and
that consequently, the fact that liquidation rights are given effect to preserve the claim-
ant's priority in the allocation of new securities weighs against awarding compensation
for these same rights. Such compensation would seem to amount to double payment.
This double payment would be at the expense of the junior claims, because any payment
made to the senior claims reduces the fund from which the juniors are to be paid.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1964).
35. Chicago, Mil. St. P. & Pac. R.R. Reorganization, 254 I.C.C. 707 (1943), 257
I.C.C. 223 (1944), affd, 145 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1964). For prior Commission deci-
sion see 239 I.C.C. 485 (1940).
36. 254 I.C.C. 349 (1943), aif'd, 62 F. Supp. 384 (D. Colo. 1944), rev'd, 150 F.2d
28 (10th Cir. 1945), rev'd sub nom. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & Rio G. W.
R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946). For prior Commission decisions see 254 I.C.C. 5 (1942),
239 I.C.C. 583 (1940), and 233 I.C.C. 515 (1939).
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first trust mortgage bonds were compensated with new mortgage bonds and
inferior securities. The result of compensation in more than one class of
security had reduced the quality of the first trusts' claim to earnings. In
compensation for this reduction the first trusts received an increase in their
rate of return, from four percent to 4.13 percent. They were further bene-
fited by a substantial reduction in the amount of debt per mile of track
which secured their claim and by lowering of the minimum amount of earn-
ings which would be required in order to pay the interest to which they
were entitled.3 7 Since the purpose of a reorganization plan is to reduce debt
and fixed charges, these additional benefits accorded the first trusts were a
consequence of the plan of reorganization rather than a deliberate attempt
to compensate them for the loss of qualitative rights.
Another class of bonds in the Denver & Rio Grande reorganization, the
Rio Grande Junctions, received 3.5 percent more compensation, in terms of
their total claim, in senior securities than did the first trusts. Despite this
difference, the ICC cited the same benefits that accrued to the first trusts
as providing compensation for the Junctions.
38
In the same reorganization, the ICC stated: "Loss in earnings position and
surrender of other rights, in our opinion, are offset by the possibility of in-
creased return permitted by the 4.5 percent income bonds, five percent
convertible preferred stock, unlimited dividends on common stock, and the
other features of the plan. . .. ,,39 The ICC also declared: "It is our view
that the various features of the new securities and of the plan as a whole
adequately compensate the holders of the old refunding and improvement
bonds for the rights surrendered .... ,,40
These statements tend to reinforce the idea that the ICC does not look
farther than the usual consequences of a reorganization plan in order to find
compensation to accord the senior security holders who have given up quali-
tative rights. Thus it would seem that the requirement that senior claimants
receive compensation for the loss of qualitative rights is given little effect out-
side of the benefits accruing to the old claim by virtue of its participation
in a reorganized and, hopefully, profitable corporation. 4 1 This is undoubted-
37. 254 I.C.C. at 361.
38. Id. at 362.
39. id. at 365.
40. Id. at 366.
41. This conclusion is also supported by the treatment of first mortgage bonds in the
recent reorganization proceedings concerning the New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad. In its Fourth Supplemental Report, the ICC awarded the first morgage bond-
holders new common stock in compensation for the principal amount of their bonds and
warrants for the amount of accrued but unpaid interest. At the same time warrants
were issued for the principal amount of the income bonds. It would seem that the first
1971]
Catholic University Law Review
ly the result of the fact that in the railroad reorganizations of the 1930's
and 1940's, the ICC was faced with the problem of being unable to follow a
realistic valuation of the roads in question.
Claims of the Same Priority on Different Assets
If the corporation being reorganized were in liquidation, the secured credi-
tors would receive compensation first from the property that secured their
claims. Should that property prove insufficient to satisfy their claims, they
would be treated as unsecured creditors as to the deficiency. Under the
theory that the same result ought to be obtained in reorganizations con-
ducted in the financial situation that is a condition precedent to obtaining
relief under the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court has held that the alloca-
tions of new securities must be made with a view to the assets underlying the
claims. 42 This would seem to require that the allocations be made in senior
securities to the extent that the claim could have been satisfied by a lien,
and in junior securities to the extent that it could not have been satisfied by
the lien.
In railroad reorganizations the ICC has developed a formula to insure that
the allocations of the new securities are made in accord with the Supreme
Court's holding.43 The ICC computes the percentage of the total corporate
income that is equal to the percentage of total corporate property underlying
or securing the particular claims; it then issues the new senior securities to
the claimants in accord with this percentage. Thus if the property under-
lying the claim furnished 35 percent of the total earnings of the corporation,
the claimant would receive 35 percent of the new senior securities. If
mortgage bondholders were thus deprived of compensation for the loss of qualitative
rights while a junior class was accorded participation in the reorganized company. See
Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger New York Central R.R., 334 I.C.C. 25, 98-101 (1970).
This proceeding is also of interest because of the form the reorganization took. Rather
than continue to operate its properties, the New Haven conveyed them to the Penn-Cen-
tral in exchange for securities. Because the Trustees of the New Haven foresaw the
need, in the future, to borrow against or to sell these assets in order to meet maturing
debt claims of the reorganized New Haven, market value of the securities received from
the Penn-Central became a factor in the consideration of the earning power of the New
Haven. Id. at 93-94, 100. While this as well as the other facets of the reorganization
will undoubtedly require further reflection when the proceedings are finally completed,
it would appear that the consideration of sale or market value of the assets of the
reorganized corporation, as opposed to earning power, constitutes a departure from
the usual procedure of placing greatest emphasis on earning power. See notes 10-14
supra and accompanying text.
42. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & Rio G. W. R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946);
Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523
(1943); Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); Consolidated Rock Co. v.
Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
43, See Denver & Rio G. W, R.R., 233 I.C.C. 515, 581 (1939),
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the claimant had only a second lien on the property which secured his claim,
he would not be compensated in new senior securities unless the percentage
of total earnings attributable to the property were sufficient, under the for-
mula, to compensate first the claimant secured by the first lien.
It has been objected that the formula necessarily results in a distortion of
the value of the properties underlying the claims which it purports to pre-
serve because it applies the capitalization rate applied to total earnings to the
earnings attributable to the individual properties. 44  These latter earnings,
it has been argued, ought to be capitalized at rates appropriate to the prop-
erty which produced them in order to ensure that the value of the property
underlying the claims will be preserved in the securities issued in exchange
for the claim. In deference to administrative convenience the Supreme
Court has refused to accept this argument. 45  The argument undoubtedly
poses a more precise way of preserving the value of the liens, but the already
laborious process of formulating and approving plans of reorganization ought
not to be further complicated unless a substantial benefit would result. The
benefit that would result from the adoption of the method espoused by this
argument is apparently not so great as to justify the administrative burden of
such an adoption. In sum, the formula used by the ICC furnishes a con-
venient and reasonably accurate method of preserving the value of the prop-
erty underlying the claims in the new securites given in compensation for
the claim.
Summary
The rule of absolute priority in bankruptcy reorganization entails the match-
ing of going concern values to liquidation claims on the theory that the use
of going concern values is dictated by the fact that the corporation will
be continued, and the use of the liquidation claims is dictated by the fact
that any other method of measuring the claims against the enterprise would
result in increased participation of junior claims at the expense of the senior
claims. In the matching of going concern values to liquidation claims the
rule of absolute priority requires that each claim receive compensation for
the rights, both quantitative and qualitative, which it has surrendered. This
compensation must be meted out in strict accord with the priority of the
claims and must, insofar as possible, give effect to the liens which secured
the claims.
As can be seen from the foregoing applications of the rule, the result is a
44. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & Rio G. W. R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946);




Catholic University Law Review
rigid, almost arbitrary approach to the problem of compensating claimants,
even to the point of cutting off valuable rights which, under a literal following
of the liquidation right standard, are deserving of compensation. This rigid
approach has resulted in laxness in the area of valuation; and has in many
instances resulted in severe overvaluation.
Where overvaluation occurs, it defeats the purpose of the liquidation
rights standard by providing senior claimants with less than the qualitative
and quantitative equivalent of their claims. This results because, as has been
pointed out, the new securities to be issued in compensation for the claims
are equal to the value of the enterprise determined on a going concern basis.
If the value of the enterprise is overstated, the value of the new securities
will similarly be overstated. Consequently, qualitative and quantitative
equivalence is not effected. The senior claimants receive less than the
amount of their liquidation claim, with the result that something more is left
for the junior claimants than would have been the case had equivalence
been effected for the seniors. The value of the enterprise is therefore spread
over more of the claims, with the senior receiving less than their liquidation
claim and the juniors more than their liquidation claim.
Despite the fact that the liquidation rights standard becomes little more
than a fiction when overvaluation occurs, this standard should not be com-
pletely abandoned. When placed in a proper context, it can play a useful
role in reorganization.
Part H - The "Fair and Equitable" Test as Applied to Allocations
of Securities Under the Simplification Provisions of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act
In 1935 Congress passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act.4"
Congress' objective, in part, was to simplify existing holding company sys-
tems. This simplification typically entails the liquidation, merger, and/or
consolidation of one or more corporations in the system. Whenever legal
entities are changed or abolished by merger, liquidation or consolidation,
the securities which were outstanding against the old legal entities must be
called in and cancelled and new securities or cash issued in their place. The
new securities and/or cash issued should be distributed in a rational manner
among the old security holders so that each will receive the worth of the
security given up.
The "fair and equitable" test, employed in the reorganization provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act, was also enacted in the Public Utility Holding Com-
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1964).
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pany Act to furnish the standard by which distributions of new securities
and/or cash should be judged in order to insure that each security holder
will receive the worth of his claim and that no security holder will receive
more than his due at the expense of another.
47
The Supreme Court has held that the rule of absolute priority stemming
from Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd 48 is applicable in determina-
tions under the "fair and equitable" test of the Holding Company Act as it is
under the same test of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus under both Acts each
claimant, starting with the most senior, must receive full compensation for
the rights he surrenders before the claims junior to him may receive any com-
pensation.
49
As was pointed out in Part I of this article, the rule of absolute priority
is employed in determinations under the reorganization provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act after an initial determination has been made as to the claims
which are to participate in the reorganized corporation. Thus allocations
made under the Bankruptcy Act will not effect the determination that a class
of claims is to be denied participation. Under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, on the other hand, no initial determination of which claims
are to be excluded is made. Rather, the claims receive compensation in or-
der of their priority until the value of the enterprise is expended. 50 While
this difference in the application of the rule of absolute priority probably does
not often cause significantly different results, it is conceivable that where the
claims to be accorded participation are determined prior to the determina-
tion of the compensation to be awarded each class of claims, a class of claims
will be afforded participation which would not have received compensation
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. This appears to be most
likely to occur when compensation is given for the surrender of qualitative
rights in bankruptcy reorganizations, because the determination of the classes
of claims to be allowed to participate, discussed in Part I, does not appear
to take into account the fact that compensation must be given for the sur-
render of qualitative rights.
The major difference between the two Acts lies in the methods employed
by each to evaluate the claims against the corporation. While under the
Bankruptcy Act this evaluation is made according to the liquidation rights of
the claims, under the Holding Company Act the "investment value" of the
claims controls. The purpose of the "investment value" method of evaluating
47. 15 U.S.C. § 79k(e) (1964).
48. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
49. See notes 7 and 8 supra, and accompanying text.(
50. New England Power Ass'n, 22 S.E.C. 343 (1946).
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claims is to preserve and carry to the new corporation the relative economic
position of the claim in the old corporation. Thus, while corporations may
be merged, liquidated, consolidated, and the like, the Act is not to effect,
through these changes, any change in the economic position of the holders
of securities in the corporation.51 In other words, the valuation is to be
made as if there were no Act.
52
. A preliminary determination must be made before a value may be as-
signed any specific security. Because valuation of securities is made as if
there were no Holding Company Act, it follows that account must be taken
of any events which likely would have occurred had not the Act intervened.
One of the most significant events which must be considered is voluntary
liquidation. If the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) finds that a
51. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 199 (1948); Otis & Co. v. SEC,
323 U.S. 624 (1945); Electric Bond & Share Co., 30 S.E.C. 155 (1949). See Blair-
Smith & Helfenstein, A Death Sentence or a New Lease on Life? A Survey of Cor-
porate Adjustments Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 94 U. PA. L.
REv. 148 (1946); Brudney, supra note 15.
52. SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949). This does not mean, how-
ever, that adjustments must be made for previous divestments compelled by the Act.
If the previous divestments were "fair and equitable," the Supreme Court in the cited
case, thought it would be useless to attempt to reconstruct the system as it had existed be-
fore the impact of the Act. The Court indicated that it would consider the opposite
course to be an improper collateral attack on the previous determinations. Id. at 143.
However, should the security contract make express provision for the compensa-
tion to be paid the security in the event of a simplification under the Act, it seems prob-
able that the provision would be upheld. In New England Power Ass'n, 22 S.E.C. 343
(1946), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), charged with the responsibility
of approving plans of simplication under Section lie of the Holding Company Act, 15
U.S.C. § 79k(e) (1964), seemed to allow such a contractual provision to set the amount
of compensation to be paid in cash to the holders of notes. These notes were to be re-
tired prior to maturity under the plan. The notes provided for the payment of a one per-
cent premium if retired prior to their maturity with the exception that no premium was to
be paid if the retirement were compelled by a simplification under the Holding Company
Act. The SEC approved the retirement of the notes without the payment of the prem-
ium. However, the SEC did not indicate that a different result would have followed
absent the contractual provision. The allowance of compensation fixed by contract
might be considered to be an exception to the rule that the Holding Company Act is not
to cause a shifting of economic values, and its corollary, that the valuation of the enter-
prise and the claims against it must be made as if there were no Act. Certainly the al-
lowance of compensation fixed by contract would constitute such an exception if the
contract provisions were exacted by management with a view to benefiting their interest
in the enterprise in the event of simplification. On the other hand, good faith provi-
sions which prove to be reasonably accurate might be said to have the advantage of re-
ducing the burden on the SEC, thereby increasing the speed with which plans are pro-
cessed and approved. But the task of determining whether the provisions in question
were made in good faith and are reasonably accurate would seem to entail no less work
than the determination of the investment value of the security. Thus the advantage of
administrative convenience would not appear to be substantial, and while the SEC may
follow express contractual provisions providing for compensation in the event of simpli-
fication, it would seem that little advantage (in the form of speed of processing and ap-
proving plans) can be gained from doing so if the investment value doctrine is followed.
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corporation would have been liquidated had not the Act intervened, the SEC
measures the claims against it according to their liquidation rights. 53  This
procedure could easily be expanded to include not only a determination that
liquidation would have been likely had not the Act intervened, but also a
consideration whether voluntary corporate changes which have already oc-
curred would actually have occurred absent the motivation to avoid the im-
pact of the Act.
In Federal Light and Traction Co.,54 the SEC refused to be convinced
that a series of divestments would have taken place absent the Act. Those
in control of Federal had simplified the system which Federal controlled in
order to avoid the impact of "fair and equitable" test of the Act. A similar
approach could well be used in bankruptcy reorganization to evaluate charges
that management has drained profits and other assets from the entity under
reorganization so as to impair the financial health of the corporation and
place the assets in other ventures. This approach would permit greater
flexibility than traditional concepts of preference or fraudulent conveyance
in evaluating such charges in complex reorganizations involving only one legal
entity, such as the current Penn-Central reorganization case. 55  In the
Federal Light and Traction case, the SEC found that Federal had simplified
its utility system in order to avoid the impact of the Act. According to the
SEC, this finding required that the system be "reconstructed" so that the
investment value of the claims against Federal could be determined as if
there were no Holding Company Act.56
Finally, this approach takes into account the fact that it is not always pos-
sible to determine that liquidation would have (or could have) taken place.
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the SEC developed the prac-
tice of weighing the appropriate factors in order to reflect the probabilities.
Thus if liquidation seemed probable, the SEC was likely to pay more atten-
tion to liquidation value rather than investment value.
57
53. New England Power Ass'n, 22 S.E.C. 343, 384 (1946); El Paso Elec. Co., 17
S.E.C. 659 (1944).
54. 31 S.E.C. 619 (1950), afrd sub nom. Federal Liquidating Corp. v. SEC, 187
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1951).
55. See U.S. Is Studying Effects on Rails of Holding Firms, Wall St. J., June 29, 1970
at 4, col. 1; STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE PENN CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTrrUTIONS, pts. 1 & 2
(Comm. Print 1970).
56. Cf. SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp. 338 U.S. 96 (1949).
57. This method may reflect in reality more a tendency to split the difference than to
attempt to weigh various factors. In New England Power Ass'n, 22 S.E.C. 343, 365-
67 (1946), the SEC's treatment of the preferred shares of North Boston Lighting Prop-
erties (NOBO) seems to have been nothing more than a splitting of the difference.
NOBO's preferred had a $50 par value, the right to $3 per share per year, and an in-
vestment value, not considering liquidation rights, of $75. On liquidation it was en-
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Once the above preliminary matters are out of the way, the next step un-
der the investment value theory is to determine the investment value of the
claims against the corporation and their "equitable equivalents."' 8 The re-
mainder of this article will be devoted to an analysis of the treatment of var-
ious aspects of the old security on its exchange.
Assets and Earnings Coverage
In New England Power Association,59 the SEC was faced with the prob-
lem of allocating cash and common shares of a new holding company, New
England Electric System (NEES), among the public security holders of the
parent holding company, New England Power Association (NEPA) and its
subsidiaries, which were also holding companies (Massachusetts Power &
Light Associates, North Boston Lighting Properties, Rhode Island Public
Service Company and Massachusetts Utilities Associates, hereinafter re-
ferred to, respectively as MPL, NOBO, RIPS, and MUA).
The SEC stated:
Although, in our analysis of the various allocations proposed in
the amended plan, data are presented with respect to the under-
lying assets applicable to the securities being surrendered and to
be received, our conclusions with respect to the fairness of each
allocation are based primarily upon an analysis of the earnings
prospects of each presently outstanding security as compared with
the prospective earnings allocated to the holders of such security
if the amended plan is consummated. 0
The SEC further recognized that each allocation had to compensate the holder
of the old security for the entire set of rights and limitations embodied in the
old security.
titled to $50 per share plus accrued dividends. (There were no accrued dividends.)
The SEC awarded each preferred share $36 plus one share of common of New England
Electric System (NEES) with dividends estimated at $1.15-1.30 a year. The SEC as-
sumed that $36 constituted about one-half of the preferred's claim by the investment
value standard, and that therefore the shareholders were to be compensated for the right
to receive $1.50 in dividends by one share of NEES common. Thus the shareholders
were deprived of $0.22-0.35 in dividends. However, the SEC, following the same rea-
soning, found that $36 was 36/50ths of the liquidation claim, thus leaving $0.84 in divi-
dends to be satisfied by one NEES common share, a claim exceeded by $0.31-0.46. The
SEC did not expressly evaluate the prospect of NeBO's liquidation had not the Act in-
tervened; it stated that this was an economically desirable step and should be given con-
siderable weight.
58. The proposition that each security holder is entitled to the "equitable equiva-
lent" of the rights surrendered is widely quoted. It was first stated by Mr. Justice Doug-
las in Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523,
565 (1943).
59. 22 S.E.C. 343 (1946).
60. Id. at 361.
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An analysis of the allocations made to two classes of preferred share-
holders (RIPS preferred and MUA preferred) in the New England Power
simplification reveals that the SEC, while it may have based its allocations
primarily on earnings, also considered other factors worthy of receiving com-
pensation. In the two instances under consideration the SEC found that
the adjusted net assets underlying the new securities were less than the ad-
justed net assets underlying the securities surrendered. 61 In both instances
there were no dividend arrearages, and both classes had preferences as to as-
sets on liquidation and to dividends. Both classes had the right to limited
participation with the junior security holders after the preference as to div-
idends had been paid. In both instances the anticipated dividends attribu-
table to the securities given in exchange exceeded the dividend preference
of the shares given up. These two classes of security holders could expect
to receive a greater portion of the earnings of the enterprise than they had
previously received. The possible justifications for the excess of anticipated
dividends over the old dividend preference are as follows:
(1) the loss of right to participate with the junior securities after
the payment of the dividend preference;
(2) the loss of the following preferential, or qualitative rights:
the right to receive a definite dividend each year prior to the pay-
ment of dividends to the junior holders; the right to be paid all
such dividends that had not been paid in previous years prior to
the payment of dividends to the junior securities; and the right to
be paid the liquidation claim of the preferred shares prior to the
distribution of assets to the junior securities on liquidation;
(3) the loss of asset coverage;
(4) the loss of the investment in a particular corporate entity.
Because the earnings of the old corporation had never been great enough
to bring the right to participate with the junior securities in dividends into
operation, it is reasonable to eliminate this justification for the excess of an-
ticipated dividends over the old dividend preferences.
The second possible justification for the excess of anticipated dividends
over the old dividend preferences (the loss of preferential, or qualitative,
rights) may have furnished the basis for increasing the preferred share-
holders' expectancy as to dividends.
The data presented do not provide a basis for drawing a reliable con-
clusion, but because cash is qualitatively superior compensation, 62 the fact
61. The data presented by the SEC tend to indicate that the term "assets underlying
the securities" is intended to mean the worth of the liquidation claim of the securities.
In the case of the MUA preferred, both adjusted net and per books assets coverage
were reduced.
62. For a discussion of cash as qualitatively superior compensation in bankruptcy
reorganization, see Part I of this article. The SEC's treatment of cash as qualitatively
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that both preferreds received partial cash payments tends to indicate that the
excess of anticipated dividends over the old dividend preferences was not in-
tended to compensate the shareholders for the loss of their preferential
superior compensation is borne out by the following analysis. In the first of the two in-
stances (RIPS preferred) a comparison of the claim to earnings of the next junior stock
reveals that, prior to simplification, the preferred received $50 for each $100 paid to
the next junior stock. The plan approved by the SEC changed this ratio to $48.46 paid
the preferred for each payment of $100 to the next junior class. The latter ratio is
based on the estimate of dividends which the SEC felt the shareholders could reasonably
anticipate. 22 S.E.C. at 375-77. The next junior class was expected to receive divi-
dends between $4.31 and $4.87 annually-the median figure of $4.59 was used for the
computation-and the preferred was expected to receive dividends betwen $2.15 and
$2.30 annually-the median figure of $2.25 was used for the computation. Both the
preferred and the next junior stock were entitled to receive dividends prior to the pay-
ment of dividends to classes junior to them. The preferred received a cash payment and
new stock in satisfaction of its claim and the next junior stock received only new stock in
satisfication of its claim. Because classes of stock junior to both the preferred and the
next junior class received compensation, it is reasonable to assume that both the pre-
ferred and the next junior class were equally entitled to compensation. This assumption
follows from the fact that the rule of absolute priority requires that each senior class be
fully compensated before any payments are made to junior classes. Because both
classes were equally entitled to compensation for the loss of their preferential rights, and
because a downward adjustment in the preferred's relative claim to dividends was made,
it follows that the preferred received partial compensation which was qualitatively su-
perior to that given the next junior class.
In American & Foreign Power Co., 32 S.E.C. 655 (1951), af'd, 197 F.2d 307 (Ist
Cir. 1952), the SEC in order to properly compensate the holders of two classes of pre-
ferred shares with successive claims on earnings, approved a plan which increased the
junior preferred's relative claim to earnings, an adjustment necessitated by the fact that
the senior preferred had received partial compensation in more senior securities than had
the junior preferred, thus giving the senior preferred compensation of a higher qual-
ity. The cash payment made to the RIPS preferred in the instance under consideration
may reasonably be considered to call for the same type of adjustment that the unequal
compensation in senior securities necessitated in the American & Foreign Power case,
supra.
In the second instance under consideration (MUA preferred), the preferred share-
holders received cash and new securities in compensation for the rights they surrendered.
The next junior class to the preferred was the common. The common had received no
dividend payments in past years, and in the event of liquidation, the common would
probably have received very little if anything in the distribution of the assets of the cor-
poration. Yet the common's earnings expectancy, which had been roughly $6.20 for
each $100 payment to the preferred, was transformed into a dividend expectancy of ap-
proximately $23.98 for each $100 payment to the preferred.
The MUA preferred was entitled to a dividend of five percent of its expressed value
per share of $50. The MUA common had earned $0.06 per share and it was estimated
that it would earn $0.25. The median ($0.15) was used in the computation. The MUA
preferred was exchanged for cash and new common stock which was considered to be
equivalent to a return of $2.72 to $2.94 in dividends (the median-$2.83-was used in
the computation). The common received new common stock which carried with it the
expectation of dividends of $0.17 to $1.20 per share of old common (the median-$0.685
-was used in the computation).
The common's relative claim to earnings was almost quadrupled. This points up the
fact that cash is qualitatively superior compensation. But, although the common was
entitled to whatever value was left in the corporation after the senior securities received
compensation, it is difficult to imagine how the partial cash payment made to the pre-
ferred could justify the extremely favorable treatment accorded the common. Cf. SEC
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rights. The shareholders having received partial qualitatively superior com-
pensation, their claim in respect of the loss of qualitative rights would be
eliminated or reduced.
The fourth possible justification, the loss of an investment in a particular
corporate entity, would not appear to justify the increase in anticipated divi-
dends over the old dividend preference because, to the extent that compensa-
tion consisted of new securities, the shareholders' investment was continued
in the same enterprise, if not the same entity.
The remaining possible justification for the excess of anticipated dividends
over the old dividend preference is the third, the loss of asset coverage.
While the SEC's opinions do not make plain the rationale behind the term
"asset coverage," the data that are presented tend to indicate that with re-
spect to preferred stock and more senior securities the term is intended to
indicate the value of the liquidation claim of the securities. With respect to
common stock, the data tend to indicate that the term implies that the stock
is backed by the excess of assets over the liquidation claims of the senior
securities.
The RIPS preferred received an 11.25 percent increase in anticipated
dividends and at the same time its adjusted net asset coverage was reduced
by more than 16.06 percent. The MUA preferred received a 13.20 per-
cent increase in anticipated dividends and at the same time its adjusted net
asset coverage was reduced by 20.16 percent.
These figures should be compared with the ones for the New England
Power Association63 six percent and two dollar preferred, both of which had
arrearages which the SEC sought to compensate through an increased claim
to earnings. The six percent preferred's increase was 10.25 percent com-
pared to a 6.55 percent decrease in adjusted net asset coverage. The two
dollar preferred was awarded a 10.50 percent increase compared to a 5.08
percent decrease in adjusted net asset coverage. If the amount of the
v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949).
The fact that a relatively lesser claim to earnings accompanied the cash payment in
both instances, while it is indicative of an awareness on the part of the SEC of the prob-
lem of the quality of the claims, does not shed much light on the problem of justifying
the increase in anticipated earnings. While adjustments between two successive claims
for differences in the quality of the compensation afforded them would be appropriate
whether the anticipated earnings were increased or decreased, the fact that in both in-
stances a cash payment (which may be considered to be of higher quality than the pref-
erential rights given up) was made tends to indicate that the increase in anticipated divi-
dends was not given for the loss of preferential rights. It is, of course, impossible to
say that "X" dollars is equal to the dividend and liquidation preferences given up, but
certainly the cash would be at least partial compensation for the loss of preferential
rights.
63. 22 S.E.C. 343, 384-86 (1946). The percentage increase in earnings was com-
puted on the basis of the median of anticipated earnings for the two preferreds.
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arrearage per share is subtracted from the adjusted net asset coverage of
the new security, 64 the percentage decreases in asset coverage for the NEPA
preferreds are 27.41 percent for the six percent and 26.27 percent for the
two dollar. These figures are more nearly comparable with the figure of
20.16 percent for the MUA preferred. 65 The percentage increases in an-
ticipated dividends are, as they stand, roughly comparable.
The above computations seem to justify the conclusion that the increase in
the claim to earnings of the RIPS and MUA preferreds was given as com-
pensation for the loss of asset coverage. The percentage increase in earnings
for RIPS, MUA, NEPA six percent and two dollar preferreds were all roughly
equivalent. While the decrease in assets coverage for the NEPA preferreds
was small, both preferreds had arrearages. The decrease in asset coverage
of the MUA preferred was large; it had no arrearage.
Thus it can be seen that while the investment standard of evaluating
securities takes into account factors which may not be considered under the
liquidation standard, by considering "asset coverage," it also considers the
liquidation standard itself.
It is interesting that the decrease in asset coverage in the instances under
consideration may be likened to a failure to provide each security holder with
the equivalent of his claim under the liquidation standard. This failure is
rectified by a provision for compensation of a different kind - an increase in
earnings. It is not necessary under the investment value theory, as it is un-
der the liquidation standard, to provide each claim for a specific amount with
compensation worth that amount, a practice which more often than not is
simply a fiction. Thus it is evident that a great deal more flexibility is pro-
64. This adjustment is appropriate when it is remembered that the SEC treats asset
coverage as the value of the liquidation claim. Since both preferreds were entitled to a
liquidation preference which included arrearages, the computation of the decrease in
asset coverage should include any arrearage.
65. The fact that these figures were not comparable to the 16.06 percent decrease in
asset coverage of the RIPS preferred would seem to be of no weight because the SEC
felt that, while the assets underlying the RIPS preferred probably exceeded its liquida-
tion preference, the value assigned those assets ought not to be stated at a higher figure
than the liquidation preference. Thus the percentage decrease for RIPS was relatively
small. It is interesting to note that if the NEPA and MUA percentage asset coverage




Increase in claim to earnings: $10.25 $10.50 $13.20
Decrease in claim assets: 27.41* 26.27* 20.16
Total: $37.66 $36.77 $33.36
* These percentages were computed after subtracting the amount of the arrearages
from the asset coverage of the new security. The MUA preferred had no arrearages.
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vided under the investment value standard than the liquidation value stand-
ard.
Market Price
It seems to have been fairly well settled that the market price of a security is
not by itself an item for which compensation must be given. The Supreme
Court had occasion to decide this matter, and in so doing reversed a per-
suasive opinion written by Learned Hand.66 The problem before the court
concerned what value if any should be assigned to outstanding warrants
to purchase the common stock of the Niagara Hudson Company. The SEC
found that if a capitalization rate of 30 were applied to estimated earnings,
the value of the stock would be roughly equal to the option price. It found
further that the option price was about 3.5 times recent highs for the com-
mon stock. It felt that a capitalization rate of 15 was the highest per-
missible estimate, and even at that rate earnings would have to more than
double before the market price of the common would equal the option price.
On this basis, despite the fact that the warrants had been traded and had
never been without value on the exchange, the SEC found that the warrants
had no value.6 7 Judge Hand reversed this determnation. He felt that he
could find no evidence, substantial or otherwise, to support the SEC's deter-
mination and he believed that it was the function of Congress, not of the SEC
to legislate to the effect that the purely speculative value which the market as-
signed the warrants was not to be compensated.6 8 The Supreme Court, two
Justices dissenting,69 reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the SEC's
determination. The Court stated: "A purchaser. . . may be willing to pay
a nominal price for a warrant which has no investment value, on the mere
chance that it may be saleable in a rising market. . . This, however, does
not provide an adequate reason for allowing a value to the warrants, at the
expense of the common stock, in a reorganization under this Act."70  The
majority refused to hold that the SEC must, as a matter of law, award com-
pensation for the speculative elements embodied in the market value of the
warrants.
It would appear to be erroneous to reason from this that market value is
not a proper element of investment value. The SEC has used the price-earn-
66. Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 29 S.E.C. 773 (1949), aff'd, 86 F. Supp. 697
(N.D.N.Y. 1949), rev'd sub nom. SEC v. Leventritt, 179 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'd,
Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951).
67. 29 S.E.C. at 823.
68. 179 F.2d at 617-18.
69. Justices Frankfurter and Black agreed with Judge Hand.
70. 340 U.S. at 346.
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ings ratio of comparable securities to arrive at an investment value for a given
security. 71 The Supreme Court approved this method against the con-
tention of the common shareholders that it was erroneous to arrive at in-
vestment value through any method which did not involve a prediction as
to future earnings. It should be noted that in this particular case, instead of
new securities, the preferred shareholders were to receive cash. In this
situation the SEC, with the court's approval, shifts its standard a bit. The
objective becomes the satisfaction of the security holder's claim with suffi-
cient cash to reinvest in a comparable security. 72  The same objective ob-
tains when the security holder receives partial compensation in cash, and
the earnings which should be attributable to the cash payment are com-
puted in the same way.
Thus it would seem that market value in a securities-for-securities ex-
change, although it may be entitled to consideration, is entitled to very lit-
tle weight in arriving at investment value and is not a proper item for com-
pensation unless supported by other elements of value. In a securities-for-
cash exchange, market value, in the form of the average of the ratio of earn-
ings to market price of similar securities, seems to be the major factor. The
change of approach in a securities-for-cash exchange seems justified on the
ground that, since the security holder will not continue his investment in the
enterprise being reorganized, he ought to be compensated in such a way as to
permit him to reinvest in a comparable security.
The use of the price-earnings ratio in a securities-for-cash exchange points
up the major difference in the objectives of the liquidation and investment
value standards. Under the investment standard, the object is to preserve
the bargain that was made when the security was purchased, while under the
liquidation standard the objective is to enforce the security contract re-
gardless of the nature of the bargain or the possibility that the security con-
tract could ever have been enforced outside of reorganization.
71. Engineers Pub. Serv. Co., 24 S.E.C. 551 (1946), modified and a!f'd, 71 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Del. 1947), decree vacated and remanded to SEC, 168 F.2d 722 (3d Cir.
1948), rev'd and remanded sub nom. SEC v. Central-Illinois See. Corp., 338 U.S.
96 (1949). Cf. Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Central R.R., 334 I.C.C. 25
(1970).
Here the SEC relied on the uncontroverted testimony of an expert to reach the con-
clusion that the preferred shareholders were entitled to the redemption price of their se-
curities. The expert found the average yield for ten comparable securities and applied
it, with a slight adjustment, to the preferred shares. This resulted in a figure in excess
of the redemption price, but the latter was considered to be the upper limit of the
amount of compensation. The SEC also employed other computations to check its
result. Cf. Federal Liquidating Corp. 31 S.E.C. 619 (1950).
72. 338 U.S. at 144.
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"Call" or Redemption Price
There seems to be little question that the recovery of a security holder is
limited by the "call" or redemption price. The reasoning behind this limita-
tion is that the junior security holders, generally in control of the corporation,
could, apart from the dictates of the Act, retire the senior securities at this
price and thereby preserve any added increment in value of the senior securi-
ties in the corporation.78 By preserving the excess of the investment value
of the senior securities over their redemption price in the corporation, the
common shareholders, because they are entitled to whatever is left in the cor-
poration after the payment of all prior charges, have in effect enhanced the
value of their interest in the corporation. Should the corporation lack suf-
ficient cash to enable the common shareholders to redeem the senior securi-
ties, the above reasoning would still apply, because the favorable financial
situation, which is a prerequisite to a high investment value for the senior
securities, would seem to preclude the chance that the corporation would
never be able to acquire, at some future time, sufficient funds to accomplish
the redemption. The conclusion which follows is that the redemption price
of senior securities is an element of value existing in the junior securities
where the latter are in control of the corporation and the economic value
underlying the senior securities exceeds their redemption price. Redemp-
tion price simply provides the controlling security holders with the power to
limit the value of the senior securities and thereby preserve to themselves the
worth of the enterprise above a certain figure.
Arrearages on Preferred Shares
Because the provisions of the usual preferred share contract are such that
the preferred shareholders' right to receive dividends is limited to instances
in which there are earnings and, even then, only to receive dividends before
payments are made to the common shareholders, it is possible that even
though the corporation has had earnings, no payments have been made to
the preferred shareholders. Under usual preferred share contracts this sit-
uation gives rise to arrearages which constitute an obligation on the part
of the corporation in the event of liquidation or redemption, but not other-
wise. Because of the premise of the Act-that it shall not be construed
so as to shift values from one security to another 74 -the preferred's claim
73. Federal Liquidating Corp., 31 S.E.C. 619 (1950); Engineers Pub. Serv. Co., 24
S.E.C. 551 (1946); New England Power Ass'n, 22 S.E.C. 343 (1946); American Power
& Light Co., 21 S.E.C. 191 (1945); Buffalo, Niagara & Eastern Power Corp., 20 S.E.C.
647 (1945).
74. See notes 51 and 52 supra and accompanying text.
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is not matured. But, because to ignore the contractual right to receive pay-
ment of arrearages before the common shareholders receive dividends would
deprive the preferred shareholders of a valuable right, 75 some compensa-
tion must be given to the preferred shareholders for the arrearages. This
compensation usually takes the form of greater dividends. In United Light
& Power Co.76 the preferred shares were entitled to a liquidation preference
of $98,700,000, $38,700,000 of which were dividend arrearages. A lib-
eral estimate of earnings for the common shares to be issued to the preferred
and common shareholders of United was $6,185,000. The old preferred
shares were entitled to dividends of $3,600,000 per annum. Under the plan
they were to receive 95 percent of the new common shares with estimated
earnings of $5,875,750. The SEC did not estimate the dividends that
would be paid on these shares.
In the New England Power reorganization 7" both the NEPA and the MPL
preferreds had arrearages. The NEPA six percent preferred was entitled
to $113.50 per share on liquidation which included $13.50 in arrearages.
It was entitled to a preference as to dividends of six dollars per annum. It
received new common stock which the SEC expected would receive dividends
between $6.21 and $7.02 per annum. The NEPA two dollar preferred
was entitled to $37.83 on liquidation, which included $4.50 in arrearages.
It was entitled to a preference as to dividends of two dollars per annum after
payment of the first preferred claims. It received new common stock which
the SEC expected would receive dividends between $2.07 and $2.34 per
annum. The MPL preferred was entitled to a liquidation preference of
$52.25 which included $2.25 in arrearages. It was entitled to a prefer-
ence as to dividends of two dollars per annum. It received cash and new
common stock which the SEC expected would amount to between $1.75
and $1.91 per annum.
If the median of the anticipated dividends (in the case of United Light &
Power, anticipated earnings) on the new securities is capitalized at the rate
of return applicable to the old preferred shares, the following figures result:
(1) United-97,929,167, or about one percent less than the
liquidation preference of the preferred;
75. Generally, the preferred and common shareholders will receive common shares in
a different corporation for their old shares. Therefore, both classes will be equally en-
titled to receive dividends from the new corporation while often only the preferred were
paid dividends in the old. Thus to ignore the arrearages of the old preferred shares
would constitute a shifting of value to the old common shareholders.
76. 13 S.E.C. 1 (1943), aff'd, 51 F. Supp. 217 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd sub nom. SEC
(Otis & Co., Intervenors), 142 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1944), ajj'd, Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323
U.S. 624 (1945).
77. New England Power Ass'n, 22 S.E.C. 343 (1946).
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(2) NEPA six percent preferred-$110.25 per share, or about
three percent less than the liquidation preference;
(3) NEPA two dollar preferred-$36.75 per share, or about two
percent less than the liquidation preference;
(4) MPL preferred-$45.75 per share, or about 12 percent less
than the liquidation preference.
It should be noted that if the anticipated dividends figure had been used
for United Light & Power Co., as in the other cases, instead of anticipated
earnings, the percentage difference from the liquidation preference would
have been larger. The SEC in addition, considered the junior securities of
MPL to be without value, which explains the fact that anticipated dividends
capitalize at a considerably lower figure than the liquidation preference.
From the above it seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that the SEC
takes the following as a rough index of fairness to preferred shares with
arrearages:
D = LP, where:
D is the anticipated dividends on the new security per old preferred
share;
L is the liquidation preference (including arrearages) of the old
preferred;
P is rate of return on the old preferred shares.
The method followed by the SEC seems to be in accord with the premise
that the Act should not cause the economic values underlying the securities
to shift. So long as the corporation continues as a going concern, the sole
right of the preferred is to be paid the amount of the arrearages prior to
any payments to junior securities. Assuming that both the preferred and
the junior securities are compensated with the same new securities, the pre-
ferred will have given up this right. The common, on the other hand, hav-
ing received the right to dividends immediately instead of at some time in the
future, ought to receive a smaller amount of dividends presently than they
would have received in the future. In other words, the common, having given
up its expectancy of a sum in the future in return for a sum immediately,
ought to receive a lesser amount immediately than they had an expectancy of
receiving in the future. The expectancy should be discounted, and the rate
of discount should, of course, depend on the certainty that the expectancy
would have been realized.
7 8
Following the above method, that is, providing the preferred shareholders
with dividends which roughly equal the return they could expect on their
original investment plus the arrearages at the rate applicable to the original
78. Two distinguished commentators found that the SEC had discounted the common
stock's expectancy at the rate of 15.2 percent for 15 years in the United Power & Light
case. See Blair-Smith & Helfenstein, supra note 51.
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investment, and then discounting the expectancy of receiving dividends in
the future which the common has given up (equal to the preferred's return
attributable to arrearages) to its present value and determining the common
dividends based on this last value, would seem to best reconcile the interests
of the parties to the transaction.
In substance, the above method seems to force the preferred shareholders
to invest the amount of their arrearages in the enterprise. But that was
exactly the position these shareholders were in prior to the proceedings under
the Act. And any such forced reinvestment is always subject to being un-
done whenever the old preferred shareholders can find a market for their
new securities. In sum, it is difficult to see how a preferred shareholder,
in light of the usual incidents of his contract, could drive any better bargain
than he is accorded by this method.
Compare the rigid method followed under the liquidation value standard.
Under the liquidation value standard, the amount of the arrearage would be
lumped with the amount of the claim and quantitatively equivalent securi-
ties issued to satisfy the claim. In the process, the contractual rate of re-
turn would probably be reduced in an effort to lower fixed charges, necessita-
ting further compensation. In the final analysis, the valuation of the enter-
prise might mean that the new securities would fall far short of providing
full compensatory treatment.
How much simpler and fairer it is to provide that the rate of return
which had existed be preserved in the new securities in terms of anticipated
dividends. The security holder is also less likely to find that his supposedly
"full compensatory treatment" amounts to little more than a few high sound-
ing words.
Conclusion
We have seen that under bankruptcy reorganization proceedings claims are
matured and their dollar value controls the amount of compensation they are
to receive as if liquidation were taking place. Within this standard, claims
are awarded senior and junior securities, as dictated by their liens on the
debtor's property. The whole effort is to try to give a creditor what he would
be entitled to upon liquidation.
It has been argued that such treatment is proper in view of the fact that
both liquidation and reorganization are means of paying creditors.79 Be-
cause the other alternative, moratorium, or a failure to pay, constitutes the
only other approach, this argument finds no merit in the contention that the
79. See Blum, The "New Directions" for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1954).
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continuance of the enterprise demands a different means of evaluation in
reorganization than that employed in liquidation.
It has also been pointed out that actual liquidation for a publicly held
corporation is virtually impossible. 80  This may well be so. In any event, it
appears highly unlikely that the liquidation of any corporation whose business
holds any potential for profit or is necessary to the public would result in
the liquidation of the enterprise as well as the legal entity. Viewed in this
light, reorganization of the legal abode of a business is in effect a means of
preserving a legal entity more than a means of preserving an enterprise.
Perhaps this factor is best illustrated by the Penn-Central reorganization
now in progress. Chief among the issues to be determined legislatively in
the course of that reorganization is whether Penn-Central (and other United
States railroads) shall be privately operated for profit or operated by Gov-
ernment as a public service. The one immutable certainty is that the Penn-
Central system itself will survive.
Under these circumstances, the wisdom of the argument in favor of resort-
ing to the liquidation rights of security holders as the one and only means
of determining the worth of their claims is questionable. It has been pointed
out in previous discussions of the problem that the use of liquidation rights
has often been accompanied by an overvaluation of the worth of the cor-
poration in times of economic distress.8 ' When, as in the railroad reorgani-
zations of the thirties, adherence to the liquidation standard is accompanied
by an overvaluation of the enterprise, the liquidation standard itself be-
comes more fiction than reality.
In a situation in which the enterprise itself, as opposed to the legal entity,
could be liquidated by selling its assets in such a way that these assets would
cease to be an economic unit, the argument for the liquidation standard
seems strongest. In that situation, it would not be "fair and equitable" to de-
prive a senior creditor of any of the contractual rights embodied in his secur-
ity; consequently, liquidation rights should then provide a floor in the man-
ner developed under the bankruptcy reorganization cases.
It must also be assumed that liquidation rights should represent the maxi-
mum amount of compensation due the senior creditors in the bankruptcy
reorganization of any corporation, regardless of the feasibility of liquidation.
80. Id.
81. See Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations:
New Directions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1954); Billyou, "'New Directions": A Further
Comment, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1379 (1954); Blum, supra note 79; Blum, Corporate Reor-
ganizations Based on Cash Flow Valuations, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 173 (1970); Brudney,
The Investment-Value Doctrine and Corporate Readjustment, 72 HARv. L. REv. 645
(1959).
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Any other rule would open the door possibly to awarding the seniors com-
pensation which should go to equity interests.
Within this framework, the award of compensation to senior creditors
based on their contractual liquidation rights, where actual liquidation of the
enterprise is not feasible or possible, should be closely examined. The
award of compensation based on liquidation rights in this situation amounts
to nothing more nor less than an attempt to give senior creditors something
which they could not have obtained except through reorganization. With
liquidation denied them as a practical matter, the use of the liquidation
standard to measure their claims becomes an effort to pull them up by their
own bootstraps at the expense of the junior securities. Furthermore, the ac-
companiment of the liquidation standard by an overvaluation of the enter-
prise illustrates the inability of the senior creditors to drive the bargain to
which, under the law, they are entitled.
It has been aptly pointed out that it is not possible for the seniors to pro-
tect themselves against such overvaluation.82 It is submitted that the seniors
might actually increase their bargaining strength by a departure from the in-
flexible liquidation standard. By incorporating the investment standard
with its increased flexibility and, under it, taking into account the possibility
that the seniors could have forced liquidation, it would seem that the bar-
gaining could be placed under greater control and the value of the enter-
prise stated on a more realistic basis. More effect might well be given to
the contractual claims of the seniors.
All of this adds up to the conclusion that the award of realistic compensa-
tion for liquidation rights is not at present one of the reasonable expectations
of the senior security holders. However, asking them to incorporate a pro-
vision in their security contracts calling for the use of the investment value
standard as some writers have done is somewhat like asking a housewife
voluntarily to pay more for her groceries in an effort to provide higher
prices for farmers. 83  Even if such a provision were incorporated, it is
questionable whether it could be honored under the holding in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products.
8 4
Whether it is possible at this stage to work out effective changes in theory
through the decisional processes of the courts is doubtful. In addition, juris-
dictional problems could arise if previous corporate dealings are examined
as suggested.88 It is as if it were five minutes to midnight, and the reorgani-
82. See Blum, supra note 79.
83. See Brudney, supra note 81.
84. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
85. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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zations of greatest significance to the nation could be interminably delayed
by the hammering out of doctrine by the courts. Consequently, it appears
that what is called for is legislation which would provide for the incorpora-
tion of the investment value standard in bankruptcy reorganization while at
the same time protecting senior creditors by requiring that appropriate at-
tention be paid to the possibility and feasibility of actual liquidation.
